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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Harold Harris was convicted of Rape, Robbery, and Second Degree
Kidnapping as a result of one jury trial.
From said convictions he appeals.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged on the 29th
day of December, 1970, with the offenses of
Rape, Robbery, and First Degree Kidnapping;
(1)

at Preliminary Hearing, the charge of First
Degree Kidnapping was reduced to Second Degree Kidnapping.

The appellant was held to

stand trial on all three charges at one
time to one jury.

He was convicted on all

three charges, and committed to the Utah
State Prison under the indeterminate sentences prescribed by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant respectfully requests
this Honorable Court to reverse the judgment of the Lower Court and order that the
matter be remanded to the District Court
for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 29th day of December, 1970, at
approximately 3:45 a.m.,

(Tr. 231} Kathleen

Edwards reported to the Roy City Police that
she had just been stopped by two men in a
white Thunderbird at an intersection in Roy,
(2)

Utah, and that one of the men got into her
car at gun point, and forced her to drive
down a side street.

At that point, she was

blind folded, taken out of her car, and
placed in another car.

She testified that

the car that followed her and the car that
she was placed into after being blind folded was an old-white Thunderbird.

She testi-

fied that she was taken out of the car, and
into a home or a motel.

At that point, she

alleged that she had been raped by both of
the individuals, and after the alleged act
was conunitted, she was permitted to go into
the bathroom and get dressed.

She testi-

fied also, that the only time she had the
blind fold off of her was at the time when
she was in the bathroom, and was in the process of getting dressed.

She stated that

while she was in the bathroom,. she removed
a sanitary seat-cover from a toilet, which
was later used to identify the location of
the act as having taken place in the Travel
(3)

Lodge Motel, in Ogden,

(Tr. 152).

After

leaving the motel, Miss Edwards was returned to her car, which was still parked
in the Roy area.

She drove her car to a

gas station, and at that time called the
Roy Police.

Following the discussion with

members of the Ogden City, and Roy City
police departments, Miss Edwards went in a
patrol car to the area of the Travel Lodge
Motel, in Ogden.

At that time she indicat-

ed that she saw a car which fit the description of the car being driven by the two
alleged assailants,

(Tr.160).

The motel was

staked out by the police until approximately
7:00 a.m.

At that time, the police obtained

a key from the manager of the motel, and
entered room 132.
beds.

The room contained two

The appellant, Harris was asleep in

the bed furthest from the door.

A Richard

Burney was asleep in the other bed.

The two

men were arrested and taken to the County
Jail.

Immediately following his arrest, the

(4)

appellant was placed in a
with Richard Burney.

along

This took place be-

tween 8:00 and 8:30 a.m., and within approximately one to one and one half hours after
his arrest.
FACTS ON COMPOSITION OF LINE-UP
At the time of the line-up, Miss Edwards
was placed in a separate room and observed
the persons through a one-way mirror.

The

line-up consisted of seven individuals,
including Richard Burney, and the appellant,
Harold Harris.

Following the line-up, a

photograph was taken of the seven individuals as a group.

This photograph was ad-

mitted into evidence a Defendant's Exhibit
One.

Prior to the line-up, the victim,

Miss Edwards informed the police that one
of her assailants had on a brown-leather,
suede coat.

When the individuals were pre-

sented in the line-up, only one person had
on a brown-leather, suede coat.

(5)

That per-

son was the appellant, Harol_d Harr is.
Miss Edwards indicated that she did not
identify Harris to officer Hammond or to
officer Nebeker, both of which were the
investigating officers, but she did acknowledge that the brown-suede coat had drawn
her attention.

She made no statement to

either of the officers as to any characteristics about Harris, but indicated that
she did mention something to officer Tim
Dyer.

Sargeant Dyer testified that she

did state to him that Harris was wearing a
coat that looked like the one that one of
the assailants had on.

However, Sargeant

Dyer's official report stated that he did
not see the victim or hear what she might
have said, or what she wrote on paper.
(Tr. 303)

At Preliminary Hearing, Miss

Edwards then proceeded to make an identification of certain characteristics of the
appellant, Harris, to wit: hair color,

(6)

side-burn length, and skin texture.

She

made no notation of this at the time of
the line-up, but after having acknowledged
that she recognized the brown-suede coat,
she later upon seeing Mr. Harris in Court
proceeded to make identification of him.
On this basis, a Motion to Suppress Evidence was filed and heard just prior to
the commencement of the trial.

Upon hear-

ing the evidence, the defendant's Motion to
Suppress any in-court identification of
physical characteristics of the appellant
was denied.
FACTS RELATED TO DENIAL OF COUNSEL
AT TIME OF LINE-UP
The appellant was arrested at approximately 7:00 a.m. on the day in question,
and was placed in a line-up within an hour
to an hour and one-half thereafter.

It

was acknowledged by detective Nebeker that
Harris could have asked for an attorney to
be present, but he did not recall.

(7)

Detec-

tive Nebeker did not advise him specifically of having a right to an attorney
being present at the time of the line-up,
and detective Hammond acknowledged that he
did not advise him of the right to an attorney at the time of the line-up.

The

appellant, Harris, testified at the Motion
to Suppress hearing, and testified that
after being arrested, until the time of
the line-up, he was never permitted to
have a phone call.

Officer Clements

acknowledged that he transported Harris from
the motel to the jail, and that he did not
advise Harris of a right to an attorney at
the line-up.

Detective Padelsky, who was

involved in the arrest, acknowledged that
he never advised either of them of their
rights.
Sargeant Tim Dyer of the Ogden Police
Department testified at the hearing on the
Motion to Suppress Evidence, that he asked
both of the defendants if they wanted an

(8)

attorney, and further
no.

(Tr. 96)

that they said

Mr. Harris denied that he

made such a statement,

(Tr. 131-132) and

in fact one officer acknowledged that an
attorney was requested at the time of arrest.
(Tr . 12 0 , 2 6 2 )
Sargeant Dyer testified that he attempted to get attorney John Hutchison to assist
the defendants at the line-up (Tr. 96)
However, when Attorney Hutchison was called
to testify he stated that he had no recollection of being in the jail around 7:00 or

8:00 in the morning on any day in that time
sequence,

(Tr. 111).

Mr. Hutchison further

stated, "I don't ever remember being involved in a line-up with Dyer, though, ever,
even on my own clients."

(Tr. 114)

Sar-

geant Dyer acknowledged that he made no
mention in his official report about advising the defendants of their right to counsel.
(Tr. 97) .

(9)

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT EXCLUDING
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY WHICH AROSE OUT
OF AN ILLEGAL LINE-UP.
The appellant was placed in a line-up
approximately one hour after he was arrested.

The appellant contends that the line-

up was illegal, and in violation of his
rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, and under Article I, Sections 7
and 12, of the Constitution of Utah. Specifically the appellant contends:

(1) that

he was denied due process of law based on
the manner in which the line-up was conducted, and (2) was denied his right to
have counsel present during said line-up.
DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
The leading U.S. Supreme Court cases
on procedural due process problems involved
in conducting a line-up are: U.S. Vs. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 18 L ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct.

(10)

1926, and Gilbert Vs. California, 388

u.s.

263, 18 L ed 1178, 87 S Ct. 1951.
In U.S. Vs. Wade, supra, the Court
discussed in some depth, the general problems incurred in line-ups and the injustices which may result therefrom.

We cite

certain excerpts from that opinion.
"But the confrontation compelled by the state between the
accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit
identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable
dangers and variable factors
which might seriously, even crucially derogate from a fair trial. The vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known;
the annals of criminal law are
rife with instances of mistaken
identification .... A major factor contributing to the high
incidence of miscarriages of
justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of
suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution
presents the suspect to witnesses
for pre-trial identification.
A commentator has observed that
'[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for
more miscarriages of justice than
any other single factor --- per-

(11)

haps it is responsible for more
such errors than all other factors combined.' Wall, Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases 26. Suggestion can
be created intentionally or
unintentionally in many subtle
ways. And the dangers for the
suspect are particularly grave
when the witness's opportunity
for observation was insubstantial, and thus his susceptibility to suggestion the greatest."
{At page 228).
"What facts have been disclosed in specific cases about
the conduct of pre-trial confrontations for identification
illustrate both the potential
for substantial prejudice to
the accused at that stage, and
the need for its revelation at
trial. A conunentator provides
some striking examples:
'In a Canadian case ... the
defendant had been picked out
of a line-up of six men, Qf
which he was the only Oriental.
In other cases, a black-haired
suspect was placed among a
group of light-haired persons,
tall suspects have been made
to stand with short non-suspects, and, in a case where the
perpetrator of the crime was
known to be a youth, a suspect
under twenty was placed in a
line-up with five other persons,
all of whom were forty or over.'
Similarly state reports, in
the course of describing prior

(12)

identifications admitted as
evidence of guilt, reveal numerous instances of suggestive
procedures, for example, that
all in the line-up but the
suspect were known to the
identifying witness, that the
other participants in a lineup were grossly dissimilar in
appearance to the suspect,
that only the suspect was required to wear distinctive
clothing which the culprit allegedly wore, that the witness
is told by the police tnat they
have caught the culprit, after
which the defendant is brought
before the witness alone or is
viewed in jail, that the suspect is pointed out before or
during a line-up, and that the
participants in the line-up
are asked to try on an article
of clothing which fits only
the suspect." (At page 23 2) .
As noted in the statement of facts,
the appellant was placed in a line-up
with six other persons, and he was the
only person required to wear a brownsuede coat.

(Tr. 95)

Prior to the line-

up, Miss Edwards also stated that after
her attention had been drawn to Mr. Harris
because of the coat, she was informed that
two persons had been charged with the

(13)

offense,

(Tr. 106) and prior to the Pre-

liminary Hearing, when she made an identif ication of the characteristics of the appellant, she had talked with the police
and as a result of those discussions, there
was created in her mind, a feeling that
they (the police) may have the right man.
(Tr. 106-107).

Based on the above facts,

we cite this Court's opinion in State Vs.
Ervin, 22 Utah 2d 216, 451, P. 2d 372,
1969, wherein it was stated as follows:
"In view of the remand of
this case, we deem it advisable
to make some observations in
regard to the defendant's
contentions concerning the impropriety in the line-up.
Their position is that placing them in a line-up of six
persons: two Mexicans, and two
other Negroes, that latter not
resembling the description the
victim had given of her assailants, had the effect of being
unduly persuasive upon her to
identify these defendants as
the men who committed the crime.
We are in accord with the idea
that a line-up should be neither
so devised nor manipulated as
to impel or to be unduly suggestive as to the identification.
Ideally it should be regarded as
(14)

having a dual purpose. On the
one hand, to help in searching
out and identifying those guilty
of crime. On the other hand,
the equally important corollary:
to protect those who are suspected of crime, but who are
innocent. To best serve both
purposes, the procedure should
be handled with caution not to
place blame on the innocent,
and yet not so laden with difficulties nor burden with supercautions as to make it impractical as a method of identifying the guilty."
We also cite as authority, People Vs.
Conley, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 745 (1949), and refer
this Court to U.S. Vs. Wade, supra, for
its discussion of this type of procedure.
The Thirty-ninth Regular Session of
the Utah Legislature enacted into Law S.B.
No. 5, Laws of Utah, 1971, chapter 198, a
law concerning line-up procedures.

So

far as is relevant to this particular
point, we cite Section 3,

(procedure) of

that law.
"The peace officers conducting a line-up shall not
attempt to influence the identification of any particular suspect in the line-up. The
(15)

entire line-up procedure shall
be a hearing of record, including all conversations between the witnesses and the
conducting peace officers.
The suspect shall have access
to copies of any photographs
taken of the suspect or any
other persons in connection with
a line-up."
We realize the above statute was not
in force at the time of appellant's lineup, but we cite it as persuasive authority as to what this Court would hold on
the question of line-up procedures.
DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT LINE-UP
The appellant was arrested, handcuffed, and taken into custody at approximately 7:00 a.m.

Within one to one and

one half hours, he was placed in a lineup.

During that period of time he had

asked for an attorney, and had not been
given a phone call.

The facts of the case

show that there was no necessity in holding a line-up that fast and without the
aid of counsel.

(16)

The facts further show that the victim was unduly influenced by the line-up
procedure and subsequent discussions with
the police officers.
In U.S. Vs. Wade, supra, the Court
stated at page 219 as follows:
"Since it appears that there
is grave potential for prejudice,
intentional or not, in the pretrial line-up, which may not be
capable of reconstruction at
trial, and since presence of
counsel itself can often avert
prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial,
there can be little doubt that
for Wade, the post-indictment
line-up was a critical stage
of the prosecution at which he
was as much entitled to such
aid [of counsel] ... as at the
trial itself. Powell Vs. Ala
bama, supra, 287 US 45, 57,
77 L ed 158, 164, 53 S Ct. 55,
84 ALR 527. Thus both Wade and
his counsel should have been
notified of the impending lineup, and counsel's presence sho_uld
have been a requisite to conduct
of the line-up, absent an intelligent waiver.
See Carnley Vs.
Cochran, 369 US 506, 8 Led 2d
70, 82 s Ct. 884. No substantial countervailing policy considerations have been advanced
against the requirement of the
presence of counsel. Concern
(17)

is expressed that the _requirement
will forestall prompt identifications and result in obstruction of the confrontations. As
for the first, we note that in the
two cases in which the right to
counsel is today held to apply,
counsel had already been appointed and no argument is made in
either case that notice to counsel would have prejudicially delayed the confrontations."
In a related case decided the same day,
the Supreme Court stated.
"The admission of the Court
identifications without first
determining that they were not
tainted by the illegal line-up,
but were of independent origin was constitutional error."
Gilbert Vs. U.S. 388 US 263, 18
L ed 2d 1178, 87 S Ct. 1951.
In both the Wade case and the Gilbert
case, the line-up was conducted after the
defendants had been indicted and counsel
had been appointed.

The Court did not

specifically hold that the Wade and Gilbert
decisions would apply to pre-indictment or
arraignment line-ups.

In this connection,

we cite, Escobedo Vs. Illinois 378 US 478,
12 Led 2d 977, 84 S Ct. 1758.

(18)

Also, the

California Supreme Court has addressed
itself to this specific point as follows:
"The line-up in question took
place after June 12, 1967, the
date of the Wade and Gilbert decisions; the rules therein enunciated are therefore applicable.
(Stovall Vs. Denno (1967) 388
US 293, 87 S Ct. 1967, 18 Led
2d 1199). The fact that the
line-up took place prior to
formal accusation is of no moment.
(People Vs. Fowler 1969,
1 Cal. 3d 335, 342-344, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 363, 461 P. 2d 643.)
Because defendant Dixon was not
represented by counsel at the
line-up, it is clear that that
line-up was conducted in violation of the Wade-Gilbert rules
---and that the admission of
evidence concerning his identification at the line-up was
per se erroneous, (Gilbert Vs.
California, supra, 388 US 263,
272-274, 87 S Ct. 1951;
People Vs. Fowler, supra, 1 Cal.
3d 335, 341, 349-350, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 363, 461 P 2d 643) --unless he effectively waived the
right to be so represented."
People Vs. Banks, 84 Cal.Rptr.
3 61 , 4 6 5 P 2d 2 6 3 ( 19 7 0) , at
268.
Also, in People Vs. Banks, supra, at
219, the Court stated:
"By a parity of reasoning, we
believe that an unsophisticated defendant might well con(19)

elude that rights available to
to him in a context of interrogation are not available in
a line-up context--especially
when it does not appear that
he has acknowledged awareness
of his rights. Thus, such a
defendant might conclude that,
whereas comprehensive rights
to counsel are available when
he undergoes a process of interrogation in order to safeguard his right to be silent,
such rights are not provided
when he appears in a line-up
because he will not be called
upon to make verbal responses
and commitments. In view of
this possibility we hold that
the admonition required by the
Miranda decision as to rights
upon interrogation is not sufficient to permit a valid
waiver of rights available in
a line-up -- and that specific admonition as to line-up
rights is essential to a valid waiver of such rights.
Because defendant Dixon was
not represented by counsel at
the line-up, and did not effectively waive his right to be
so represented, it was error
per se to admit evidence concerning his identification at
the line-up.
(Gilbert Vs.
California, supra, 388 US 263,
272-274, 87 S Ct. 1951; People
Vs. Fowler, supra, 1 Cal. 3d
335, 341, 349-350, 82 Cal.Rptr.

(20)

363, 461 P. 2d 643.)
This error
compels reversal of judgment convicting Dixon unless the People
can show "beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained
of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." Chapman Vs.
California, ( 19 67) 3 8 6 US 18,
24, 87 S Ct. 824, 828, 17 L ed
2d 705; see Gilbert Vs. California, (1967) 386 US 18, 24,
Ct. 1951; People Vs. Fowler,
supra, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 349-350,
82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 461 P. 2d
643.)
In conclusion, we also cite the laws

of Utah, 1971, Chapter 198, Section 2.
"A suspect has the right to
have his attorney present at
a line-up, and the magistrate
shall notify the suspect of
this right.
Every person that
is unable to employ counsel
shall have representation by
an attorney appointed by the
magistrate for purposes of
the line-up."
This is cited as persuasive authority
as to what the law was in Utah at the time
of the appellant's arrest.

(21)

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUBMITTING LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSES TO THE JURY.
(A) RAPE---LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
Miss Edwards testified that both of
the assailants had intercourse with her,
and that both of them had an emission,
(Tr. 147).

Based on Miss Edwards' testi-

mony, this would have occurred between
2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m.

Miss Edwards was

examined by Dr. Leo Stevenson shortly
after 9:30 a.m. the same morning.

Dr.

Stevenson testified that there was evidence of intercourse,

(Tr. 202).

He

further testified that he removed some
semen from Miss Edwards for analysis, but
in examining it very closely under a microscope, he was unable to locate any live
sperm.

We refer the Court to the entire

cross-examination of Dr. Stevenson for the
purpose of showing the doubt that the
semen had been deposited in her at the time
she was allegedly raped.
(22)

From this stand

point, the appellant contends that the
Trial Court should have included, in the
possible verdicts, "Assault with intent
to commit Rape," and "Simple Assault,"
as requested (Tr. 28).
In support of appellant's contention,
we cite State Vs. Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 58
Pac. 1108, as follows:
"The information charged the
defendant with the specific
offense of Rape.
That charge
necessarily included an Assault
with intent to commit Rape ....
Even though, from the evidence,
it may appear that the offense
of Rape was actually completed,
still the jury had the power
to convict the defendant of the
lesser offense, however illogical such conviction may seem;"
(B) ROBBERY---LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
Miss Edwards testified that the assailants robbed her of $50.00,

(Tr. 141-142).

However, Mr. Burney is the person who
took the money from her.

At the time

the money was taken, Mr. Burney was in

(23)

the back seat with her, and the person
alleged to be the appellant was driving.
Miss Edwards acknowledged that the driver
told Mr. Burney to let her keep it,
142).

(Tr.

Miss Edwards believed that the

driver's comment was directed towards
another $8.00 she had, but a review of
her testimony shows some uncertainty
as to the driver's intent.

From this

stand-point, the appellant was entitled
to an instruction and verdict form on
the lesser included offense of being an
"Accessory after the Fact," 76-1-45 Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
(C) KIDNAPPING--LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
Miss Edwards was detained from 1:40
a.m. until approximately 3:40 a.m. the
same morning, a total period of two hours.
Under 76-21-1 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, it is stated that "False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another."
( 24)

Under the facts

of this case, the jury should have been
instructed on the lesser included offense
of False Imprisonment.
Miss Edwards also stated that Mr.
Burney apologized to her and that their
intention was just to rob me.

(Tr. 178)

In State Vs. Olsen, 76 Utah 181,
289 Pac. 92, this Court stated as follows:
"The crime of false imprisonment is included within
the crime of kidnapping ....
It is difficult if not impossible, to distinguish between
the intent to cause a person
to be confined or imprisoned
and the intent to cause a
person to be kept or detained."
At the very least, such a distinction
is a jury question.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above points, the
appellant respectfully requests a

trial.

Respectfully Submitted.

. DON SHARP
Attorney at Law
523 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
(25)

